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THE END OF WARS AS THE BASIS
FOR A LASTING PEACE
A Look at the Great Wars of the Twentieth Century
Donald Kagan
Peace agreements may be judged from several perspectives—their gentlenessor severity, their equity or injustice—but perhaps the most important
criteria are their prospects for longevity. Whatever its other qualities, a peace
cannot be deemed successful if it soon gives way to another war. The Second
World War emerged from flaws in the previous peace and the failure of the vic-
tors to alter or defend vigilantly and vigorously the settlement they imposed; the
collapse of that peace provided influential lessons for the victors in the resulting
war. The First World War ended when the collapse of the Central Powers’ armies
in the Balkans forced the Germans to seek peace. That was not, however, the pic-
ture received by most Germans, who for the most part were unaware that their
army had been defeated and was crumbling. No foreign soldier stood on Ger-
man soil. The socialist chancellor of the newly founded republic greeted return-
ing soldiers with the words, “As you return unconquered from the field of battle,
I salute you”; it was generally believed that Germany had voluntarily laid down
its arms, and that only when President Woodrow Wilson made a reasonable of-
fer of peace.1 One German town greeted its returning troops with a banner read-
ing, “Welcome, brave soldiers, your work has been done, God and Wilson will
carry it on.”2 The peace the Germans were ultimately required to sign was differ-
ent from their expectations, and many of them came to believe that Germany had
not been defeated but tricked by the enemy and betrayed—even stabbed in the
back—by pacifists, Jews, republicans, and socialists at home. This version of his-
tory helped bring Hitler to power.
The Second World War richly deserves the title applied to it by Churchill, “the
unnecessary war.” The victorious nations in the First World War brought it to an
end using language of idealistic generosity in which they did not believe,
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creating utopian expectations whose inevitable collapse produced bitterness
and cynicism and permitted complaints to excuse irresponsible behavior of
more than one kind. They vaguely put their hopes for peace in international or-
ganizations such as the League of Nations, though no nation abandoned any
measure of sovereignty and the League had no armed forces. When the United
States failed to ratify the treaty, join the League, or guarantee French security, the
entire basis for preserving the peace in the face of a large, bitter, and mainly in-
tact Germany was undermined. The task of preserving the peace fell to France
and Britain. Given France’s many weaknesses, that meant chiefly Britain.
British leaders in the years between the wars were powerfully impressed by
what they took to be the lessons of the First World War. For them the Great War
and the terrible destruction that came from it had been caused not by German
ambition abetted by British hesitation but by the prewar arms race, the alliance
system, and the willingness of Britain to commit a land army of significant size
to a war on the continent. British leaders were easily persuaded by the liberal and
radical intellectuals of the day who rejected traditional ideas of power balances
and military strength as necessary devices for keeping the peace.
Revisionist historians and publicists convinced many in Britain’s governing
class that the Western allies had been at least as responsible as the Germans for
the war, that greater understanding, more generosity, and patience were better
ways to avoid war than military deterrence. The British accordingly failed to re-
act to the menace created by German ambitions between the wars, even to the
extent they had before 1914. Few took the League of Nations seriously. It served
chiefly as a form of self-delusion or an excuse for inaction. Whenever tested, it
proved the emptiness of the concept of collective security when not led by states
having the will and the means to resist aggression.
Pacifism, isolationism, and other forms of wishful thinking were widespread
in Britain and contributed to the mood favoring disarmament and concessions.
The idea of maintaining peace through strength was not in fashion. The main
damage to international security and the prospect of peace was done in the
1920s, when Britain rapidly disarmed and abandoned its continental responsi-
bilities, deliberately disregarding and denying the threat that Germany would
inevitably pose. The British were driven by the traditional desire to remain aloof
from continental involvements and maintain “the free hand,” by an unwilling-
ness to spend money for arms rather than for increasing social concerns, and by
a determination to lower taxes, but most of all by the horrible memories of the
last war and the deadly fear of a new one.
The French, much less influenced by the intellectual currents so powerful in
Britain and America, were psychologically crippled by the memory of the
slaughters of 1914–18, when excessive reliance on the offensive had led to
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disaster. French military and political leaders were dominated by that one his-
torical analogy alone. They built the Maginot Line and tried to hide behind it,
though it was incomplete and provided an inadequate defense. Their war plans,
such as they were, contained no suggestion of taking the offensive first, even
against so puny a force as the Germans placed in the Rhineland in 1936.
Had the French and the British between the wars examined their political and
strategic situation objectively and realistically, they would have seen that an of-
fensive element was essential to their thoroughly defensive goals of maintaining
the peace and security of the new Eu-
rope. There was no point in feeling
guilty about what they had done to
Germany at the peace conference.
They were willing to change the terms of the peace, and without compulsion,
but what changes would have satisfied Germany? Berlin would consider suffi-
cient only alterations made at the expense of the new nations of Eastern Europe,
which had been established on the high principle of national self-determina-
tion, as well as the lower one of security for France against a revived and far more
powerful Germany. Even a reasonable German nationalist like Gustav
Stresemann sought changes unacceptable to the successor states. Adolf Hitler re-
peated many times, in speeches and in writings, that he wanted the new nations
obliterated. Changes like those the Germans wanted were not possible without
abandoning both high and low principles. The Western democracies, therefore,
had no choice but to defend the status quo against all but minor revisions unless
they were prepared to abandon all principle and all security. Had they faced that
hard fact, they would have seen that the easiest, cheapest, and safest way to ac-
complish that end was to keep the Germans effectively disarmed for the foresee-
able future. Failing that, they had to keep the Rhineland demilitarized and be
prepared to launch an attack through it if the Germans attacked the eastern
states. Whatever its faults, such an approach would have been operationally easy
and inexpensive; it would have protected the security of Britain, France, and the
successor states; and it would have avoided a major war.
No such program was undertaken, because the Western leaders, and many of
their people, examined their situation not objectively and realistically but emo-
tionally and hopefully. They were moved by horror of war, fear of its reappear-
ance, and blind hope that refusal to contemplate war and prepare for it,
combined with conciliation and generosity toward the beaten foe—never mind
the cost to its potential victims—would somehow keep the peace. They paid for
their mistake with the most terrible war in history.
The peace that ended the Second World War, however, was entirely different
from the one that concluded the first. The leaders of the countries who won the
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second conflict learned very different lessons from those that had influenced
their predecessors. They insisted on a policy of “unconditional surrender” and
held to it, at least in Europe. This time the victorious forces smashed into Ger-
many from east and west, bringing home the reality of defeat to the losers; they
were prepared to occupy the enemy’s land until a satisfactory peace had been
made. It is ironic that so complete and unquestioned a victory was not con-
cluded by a peace treaty. Even before the end of the war, the split between the So-
viet Union and the Western allies began to appear, and the two sides could not
agree on a general peace. To deal with immediately unavoidable issues, Russia’s
western frontier was moved far into what had been Poland, including part of
German East Prussia. In effect, Poland was moved about a hundred miles west,
at the expense of Germany, to accommodate the Soviet Union. The Allies agreed
that Germany would be divided into occupation zones until the final peace
treaty was signed. But it never was signed, and Germany remained divided until
the collapse of the Soviet Union almost a half-century later.
A Council of Foreign Ministers was established to draft peace treaties for Ger-
many’s allies. Growing disagreements made the job difficult, and it was not until
February 1947 that Italy, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland signed trea-
ties. The Russians, dissatisfied with the treaty that the United States made with
Japan in 1951, signed their own agreements with the Japanese in 1956.
By that time Europe was informally but firmly divided, in the context of an
informal and uncertain peace. No sooner was the old war over than there
seemed to be a threat of a new one between victorious allies. Out of such un-
promising beginnings grew a peace that lasted for a half-century without a ma-
jor war, concluding with the peaceful collapse of one of the competitors in the
Cold War and with excellent prospects for peace in the future if the relevant na-
tions learned the proper lessons from this great and surprising success.
The end of the Second World War found Europe in a shambles, potentially a
prey to poverty, misery, and the political and military power of the Soviet Union.
Only the United States had the economic and military power to restore balance
in Europe, but the Americans now began their traditional practice of rapid de-
mobilization, disarmament, and withdrawal from commitments overseas. The
threat from the Soviet Union and the onset of the Cold War, however, imposed a
recognition and acceptance of reality, a recognition that changed American atti-
tudes and policies. The imposition of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the
menace to the independence of Greece and Turkey, the communist coup in
Czechoslovakia, and the blockade of Berlin presented immediate dangers that
enabled America’s leaders to persuade their people to undertake the responsibil-
ity of continuous engagement in order to create and preserve an international
order compatible with their ideals and interests.
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The long-range strategy pursued by the United States and its allies was the
policy of containment, first set forth by George F. Kennan and gradually adopted
in the early years of the Cold War. In this view, America’s policy should be
guided by traditional, realistic considerations of power: to restore the balance of
power in Europe and frustrate Soviet efforts to expand its power and influence,
in that way convincing Soviet leaders to change their behavior.3 This could be ac-
complished chiefly by economic, political, and psychological means designed to
surround the Soviets with strong, confident nations, societies that were able to
defend themselves against intimidation of whatever sort. This kind of thinking
produced the Marshall Plan to restore the strength, confidence, and independ-
ence of Europe, and also the reconstruction of the defeated enemies, Japan and
West Germany. Kennan understood the importance of military forces in achiev-
ing these ends. “You have no idea,” he said, “how much it contributes to the gen-
eral politeness and pleasantness of diplomacy when you have a little quiet armed
force in the background. . . . [Its existence] is probably the most important in-
strumentality of U.S. foreign policy.”4 But he regarded the Soviet threat as chiefly
political, not to be checked by military means alone—a thoroughly reasonable
judgment when communist parties were large and threatening in France and It-
aly, and before the Soviets had an atomic bomb. Kennan’s focus was on Western
Europe, but his vision of American security was worldwide, with different tac-
tics needed in different parts of the globe.
Kennan also hoped that a successful policy of containment would subject the
Soviet empire to internal strains that might dismember it. He even thought that a
frustrated Soviet regime might one day crumble internally and be overthrown.5
Early in 1950, Paul Nitze replaced Kennan as the head of the State Depart-
ment’s Policy Planning Staff. He and his staff were charged with producing a
comprehensive statement of national security policy, the general foundation
(that Kennan had never written) of the containment strategy; the result would
be the document known as NSC-68. That formulation sought to frustrate Mos-
cow’s goal of expanding Soviet power by undermining and overawing other
nations. Confronted by steady, determined resistance, Russian leaders might
change, live in peace, and behave in tolerable ways. The point was to get the So-
viets to accept “the specific and limited conditions requisite to an international
environment in which free institutions can flourish, and in which the Russian
peoples will have a new chance to work out their destiny.”6 There were also im-
portant weaknesses of the Soviet state that might defeat its aggressive designs
from within. The problem of succession faced by all dictatorships might cause
internal instability; nationalism and unreasonable Soviet demands might lead
satellites to break away, as Iosip Tito’s Yugoslavia had done, leading to the disso-
lution of the Soviet empire; the flaws of its domestic system might bring it down.
K A G A N 1 5
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Only firm resistance, however, could bring these weaknesses to the fore. “So long
as the Kremlin retains the initiative, so long as it can keep on the offensive unchal-
lenged by clearly superior counterforce—spiritual as well as material—its vulner-
abilities are largely inoperative and even concealed by its successes. The Kremlin
has not yet been given real reason to fear and be diverted by the rot within its system.”7
NSC-68 sought to provide a plan for the needed resistance. Important
changes had occurred since 1947. Kennan had regarded the international system
as stable; recent events, however, suggested anything but stability, as new territo-
ries fell under communist rule and
Soviet military power grew. De-
fending even the strong points that
Kennan had thought important
called for an increased American
military commitment. In the ab-
sence of American military power,
these nations would be intimidated and lose the confidence on which the theory
of containment rested. Beyond that, the two-sided struggle had come into focus,
bringing the whole world into the picture. While hoping to pursue containment
peacefully, through deterrence, the drafters of NSC-68 recognized that it might
be necessary on occasion to fight local wars on the periphery.
Nitze therefore called for a vast increase in America’s military capacity and
expenditures to permit resistance by conventional forces, not merely by the
menace of the atomic bomb, whose credibility had been undermined by its ac-
quisition by the Soviets. There was considerable opposition to the high cost of
the program; some feared that it would ruin the American economy. However,
NSC-68 argued that with military expenditures representing only 5 percent of
the gross national product and the economy operating well below capacity, the
needed funds could be acquired by stimulating the economy through the very
program being proposed, without inflation and without damage to domestic
well-being. That Nitze’s argument was sound would be shown by the economic
boom that lasted from the 1950s until the economic distortions caused by the
government’s handling of the Vietnam War. In 1950, however, that prospect was
far from clear, and President Harry Truman did not give formal approval of the
policy until September. By then the outbreak of the Korean War in June seemed
to have confirmed the evaluation presented by NSC-68, which thereafter be-
came the foundation stone of American foreign policy.
The policy of containment laid out in these years was a rare example of a state
making a rational evaluation of the problems it faced, the nature of its oppo-
nent, and the character of the threat to stability and peace, and then deciding on
a reasoned course of action with the sacrifices and commitments needed for
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success. It was a realistic and nuanced approach that gave full weight to the im-
portance of ideas, economics, institutions, culture, and the need to adapt to
change, at the same time as it acknowledged the need for military power and a
manifest willingness to use it when necessary.
The adoption of the fully shaped policy of containment required a sharp
break with America’s past. Contrary to its traditions, the United States thus
joined in a continuing alliance with nations in Europe and later in other parts of
the world. It consciously undertook the chief burden of preserving the peace un-
der conditions tolerable to itself and its allies, gearing its economy for the pur-
pose and adopting military conscription in peacetime. These taxing and
extraordinary measures were taken to meet what American leaders took to be a
serious and imminent threat, but they were shaped also by their understanding
of the origins of the Second World War. These they took to have been the failure
of the Western democracies to meet their responsibilities after the First World
War, their withdrawal into isolation, and their unwillingness to bear the cost of
keeping the peace, which had been the maintenance of the capacity and will to
resist detrimental changes in the balance of power caused by dissatisfied states,
which used subversion, threats, and military force to achieve their purposes.
For a time, however, weakened and divided by the war in Vietnam and by do-
mestic travails, American leaders wavered, reverting to an earlier model. They
seemed to retreat, to seek to win peace through unilateral reduction of the na-
tion’s military power and through attempts at appeasement; the result was
détente, culminating in the Jimmy Carter administration. In those years Soviet
power and influence around the globe grew to unprecedented levels, in extent,
boldness, and intensity. “The 1970s witnessed three massive Soviet airlifts and
sealifts to client regimes at war, the deployment in combat of over forty thou-
sand Soviet-armed Cuban troops in Africa, and the outright invasion of a Third
World country by the USSR—all phenomena unheard of during the [early years
of the] Cold War.”8 By 1982 Soviet combat forces and advisers were to be found
in many countries in Asia and Africa: Angola, Cambodia, Iraq, Libya, Mali,
Mauritania, Mozambique, the Seychelles, Syria, Vietnam, and North and South
Yemen. To these forces could be added military and paramilitary forces from
East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Cuba. Men and equipment from the Soviet
Union and its satellites enabled communist forces to gain control of Angola in
1975 and permitted the victory of Haile-Mariam Mengistu’s brutal Ethiopian
regime over the Somalis in 1978.9
None of these interventions could be dismissed by the usual explanations of-
fered by Soviet apologists—that is, some version of self-defense—for such
places had no inherent strategic importance or even any historical connection
with Russia or the Soviet Union. Western analysts, in fact, had a difficult time
K A G A N 1 7
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understanding what the Soviets were after and why they were after it. A clue may
be provided by the comparison between the Soviet Union and Kaiser Wilhelm’s
Germany. Like imperial Germany, the Soviet Union displayed a combination
(characteristic of arriviste powers) of clamoring aggressiveness, great sensitivity
to any slight to its pride, and remarkable indifference to the concerns of others.
In 1971 Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko said, in words not too different from
those the kaiser had been wont to use, “Today there is no question of signifi-
cance which can be decided without the Soviet Union or in opposition to it.”
The most striking similarities, however, were in the way the two states, dissat-
isfied with the distribution of power in the world, restlessly sought to undo the
status quo and bring about desired changes by building great military forces and
trying to use them for political purposes. A sympathetic scholar described the
Soviet Union in these terms in the last year of Carter’s presidency:
To say it simply, the Soviet Union is interested in fomenting conflicts, escalating con-
flicts, maintaining them at a high level of intensity, and exploiting them, but not in
their peaceful solution, especially in the early stages when they are most susceptible
of solution. . . .
The Soviet Union is obviously not a “sated power.” Even when measured only from
the viewpoint of great-power competition, it is a new, dynamic great power. . . . This
situation in itself would render difficult, highly competitive, and unstable any relations
with the Soviet Union now and for the foreseeable future. It would certainly preclude
realization of those exaggerated hopes of the early [Henry] Kissinger détente construed
as a long-range balance of power and agreement of spheres of interest.10
The Soviet Union’s adventurism was surely encouraged by American policy
after the Cuban missile crisis. As American military spending decreased, the So-
viets did not reciprocate but increased their own expenditures. The signing of
the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), in fact, preceded the greatest ad-
vance in the growth of Soviet strategic weapons. Secretary of Defense Harold
Brown ruefully drew the conclusion that attempts to encourage arms control by
inducing emulation of unilateral restraint had failed: “We have found that when
we build weapons, they build. When we stop, they nevertheless continue to
build.”11 The only plausible explanation of the Soviets’ behavior was that they
were seeking to acquire the capacity to force the United States, through intimi-
dation, out of the way of their ambitions. At the same time, the United States al-
lowed its conventional forces to decay. It was only the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979 that produced a turn away from détente, a return to a policy
of containment resting on increased military strength and political will.
Thus, the Carter administration rescinded its proposal for a second SALT
agreement, stopped grain shipments and forbade the sale of high technology to
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the Soviet Union, withdrew from the Olympic Games to be held in Moscow in
1980, returned to the rhetoric of the early Cold War, and launched a significant
increase in military expenditure and preparations. All this came too late to save
Carter from defeat in the 1980 elec-
tions. He was succeeded by Ronald
Reagan, a well known critic of
détente and identified with the older
policy of containment through
strength. The new president had run
on a platform calling for rejection of SALT II and for a swift increase in defense
spending to gain military preponderance over the Soviet Union.
The Reagan administration moved quickly to keep its promises to increase
America’s military strength. Among its officials were the foremost critics of pre-
vious efforts at arms control, which seemed to them always to have favored the
Soviets without reducing either the number and power of weapons or the dan-
ger of war. They now insisted on the removal of all the Soviet nuclear-tipped
SS-20 missiles that threatened Europe, promising to introduce American inter-
mediate-range missiles with nuclear warheads (as had been planned by Carter)
if the Soviets refused. They rejected arms-limitation negotiations (like SALT)
and proposed arms-reduction talks instead, calling for deep cuts in the number
of nuclear warheads on each side. Their critics denounced these proposals as
cynical efforts to undermine any serious arms negotiations. Indeed, the Soviets
broke off negotiations, worrying those who regarded arms control as essential to
the prospects of peace and thus feared the consequences of their interruption.
The Soviets launched a vast campaign of intimidation to prevent the installation
in Europe of intermediate-range Pershing II and cruise missiles, which could
reach the Soviet Union and thus would deter use of the SS-20s. They also insti-
gated a worldwide propaganda effort demanding a nuclear “freeze,” an idea that
won considerable support. Reagan responded with a speech denouncing the So-
viet Union as an “evil empire” and “the focus of evil in the modern world.”12 The
resort to such language, rarely used since the Truman administration, alarmed those
who believed that peace required friendly accommodation and cordial intercourse
at all times.
In the “third world,” the Reagan administration took the initiative against So-
viet expansion. Employing what came to be called the “Reagan Doctrine,” it sent
aid to the opponents of communism—whom the president called “freedom
fighters”—in Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia, and Nicaragua, and it
used direct military force to remove the communist government of Grenada.
Finally, Reagan introduced the Strategic Defense Initiative, a plan to build a sys-
tem that would provide a defense against missile attacks. Critics called the idea
K A G A N 1 9
The policy of containment . . . was a rare exam-
ple of a state making a rational evaluation of the
problems it faced . . . and then deciding on a
reasoned course of action.
10
Naval War College Review, Vol. 53 [2000], No. 4, Art. 3
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol53/iss4/3
absurd and labeled it “Star Wars.” On one hand, they insisted it would not
work; on the other, they assumed it would and feared that it would destabilize
the nuclear status quo, based on “mutually assured destruction.” Like his
other actions,
it called into question the President’s seriousness in seeking an end to—or even a sig-
nificant moderation of—the strategic arms race. . . .
Anyone who listened to the “evil empire” speech or who considered the implications
of “Star Wars” might well have concluded that Reagan saw the Soviet-American rela-
tionship as an elemental confrontation between virtue and wickedness that would al-
low neither negotiations nor conciliation in any form; his tone seemed more
appropriate to a medieval crusade than to a revival of containment.13
In 1984, the best-known writer on arms control gloomily wrote:
The Administration’s conduct of the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force] talks
and START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks] brought about an unprecedented crisis
in the already strained quarter-century-old arms-control process. And the crisis in
arms control contributed to three others: in the alliance between the U.S. and West-
ern Europe; in the partnership between the executive and the legislative branches of
the U.S. government; and in the Soviet-American relationship. Even if it proved tem-
porary, the deadlock in the negotiations lasted long enough to become one of the fac-
tors making Ronald Reagan’s stewardship of foreign policy and national security a
contentious issue in the 1984 presidential election.14
Such dark forebodings were unwarranted. The administration held fast to its
course and installed the Pershing IIs and cruise missiles in the Nato countries.
Strains between the executive and legislative branches were no greater than
usual. Reagan was reelected by an overwhelming margin. Nato was strength-
ened, not weakened. The Reagan Doctrine’s effort to “‘roll back’ Soviet influence
. . . [produced] impressive results at minimum cost and risk to the United
States.”15 The Soviets returned to the negotiating table for arms control talks that
ultimately produced unprecedented reductions.
There is reason to believe, moreover, that the pressure applied on the Soviets
by the growth of America’s military strength, particularly the exploitation of its
lead in technology to produce advanced weapons, had beneficial effects. Far
from crippling arms control and increasing tension, the determination to coun-
ter the Soviet SS-20s with equivalent missiles for Nato contributed powerfully to
arms reduction. At a conference at Princeton in February 1993, Anatoly
Chernyaev, who had been a personal consultant on foreign affairs to Soviet pres-
ident Mikhail Gorbachev, would make clear the relationship: “The SS-20s were a
nightmare for Europe, and the Pershing IIs were, of course, a nightmare for us,
because they were a gun aimed directly at—our very head.” This situation in
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1987 led Gorbachev to decide on “the first treaty of real disarmament that really
reduced the number of nuclear weapons[, which was] concluded in Washington
in December.”16 Alexander Bessmertnykh, deputy foreign minister under
Gorbachev, would later make even clearer the connection between the Americans’
firmness and the progress of arms control. Referring to the Soviets’ efforts to pre-
vent the installation of intermediate-range missiles into the Nato countries, he
was to recall:
I don’t remember when we . . . [had ever] raised this kind of campaign. [We] used all
methods possible: pressure, persuasion—everything. . . . So the decision was defi-
nitely a great disappointment. And there was a certain mood suddenly cast on Mos-
cow that we [had] failed[,] in that . . . the situation had tremendously deteriorated as
far as Soviet interests were concerned. But looking back from today’s position I think
that the fact itself has helped to facilitate, to strongly concentrate on the solutions. If
it were not for that [deployment,] which was negative to us, maybe the developments
would have been slower, took many more years. . . . So it kind of pushed the whole
process into much higher speed and finally brought us to a solution.17
Gorbachev was driven by other considerations as well. At the same confer-
ence Bessmertnykh would report, “As for the Soviet Union, we were already feel-
ing the pressure of the arms race. Gorbachev wanted to go on with the reforms[,]
and the continued arms race, and especially the nuclear area, was a tremendous
hindrance to the future of those reforms.”18
The Reagan administration’s approach of seeking to keep the peace through
strength fit the circumstances well. Some of its members sought chiefly to hasten
the decline of Soviet power, and thereby its capacity to threaten the peace and se-
curity of other nations, by wearing it down through competition. The president
appears to have sought to achieve security through negotiation after achieving a
position strong enough to discourage dangerous ambitions. He was prepared to
negotiate arms agreements that truly reduced the threat of nuclear war, so long
as they did not give the Soviets an advantage. Confident that the Western way of
life would triumph in a competition free of intimidation, he was prepared to
seek accommodation. His insistence on doing so from a position of strength,
and also the confidence the American people had in him and his approach, made
such arrangements possible. As one scholar, by no means uncritical of Reagan,
has put it:
Others may have seen in the doctrine of “negotiations from strength” a way of avoid-
ing negotiations altogether, but it now seems clear that the President saw in that ap-
proach the means of constructing a domestic political base without which
agreements with the Russians would almost certainly have foundered, as indeed
many of them did in the 1970s. For unless one can sustain domestic support—and
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one does not do that by appearing weak—then it is hardly likely that whatever one
has arranged with any adversary will actually come to anything. . . .
It fell to Ronald Reagan to preside over the belated but decisive success of the strategy
of containment George F. Kennan had first proposed more than four decades earlier.
For what were Gorbachev’s reforms if not the long-delayed “mellowing” of Soviet so-
ciety that Kennan had said would take place with the passage of time?19
The collapse first of the Soviet empire, then of the Communist Party, and
then of the Soviet Union itself was, of course, chiefly an internal phenomenon.
Its main cause was certainly the perverse unsuitability of the Soviet economic,
social, and political system, which might well have brought it down someday in
any case. The role of Gorbachev was also very important. His attempt to reform
a system incapable of reform inadvertently but surely hastened the collapse. The
peaceful resolution of the Cold War, however, was not inevitable. It would be a
mistake to minimize the role played by the United States and its allies in bringing
it to a peaceful end. It is not only that the leaders of the Soviet Union might have
been less cautious and brought on a war through recklessness. In the 1970s the
leaders of the United States came very close to abandoning the strategy that was
ultimately to succeed, thereby encouraging the very adventures that might have
touched off a war. From the John F. Kennedy administration after the 1962 mis-
sile crisis through the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, American adminis-
trations pursued unilateral disarmament and appeasement under the title of
détente, an apparent failure of will that reduced America’s power and prestige
and encouraged the Soviet leaders to undertake adventures that might have
sparked a conflict. The return after Afghanistan to the original policy of con-
tainment and deterrence through superior strength permitted Soviet power to
decay in a context of resigned inferiority rather than dangerous adventure.
Without the resistance presented by the containment policy, the Soviet Union
might have gained control of most of Europe and acquired resources that would
have given it a much longer run. Instead, the West, employing and returning to
the vigorous policy of containment described by Paul Nitze and the team that
drew up NSC-68, achieved its goals without a major war. It succeeded in frus-
trating the Soviet Union’s attempts to expand its power by undermining and
overawing other nations, which helped persuade its leaders to change their ways
and live in peace. It did not seek actively to overthrow the Soviet government or
to impoverish or subdue its people. The goal was to get the Soviets to accept “the
specific and limited conditions requisite to an international environment in
which free institutions can flourish, and in which the Russian peoples will have a
new chance to work out their destiny.” There is no more Soviet Union, and that is
the place at which the Russian people and their former subjects have arrived.
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The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War demonstrate
the soundness of the strategy adopted by the United States after the Second
World War, that policy’s ability to turn a strange and incomplete peace into an
unusually successful one. Its leaders resisted the powerful historical, geograph-
ical, and political tendencies that had led their predecessors to isolation and irre-
sponsibility after the First World War. Instead, they chose to accept the burden of
preserving the peace by constructing an international order that would require
the United States to expend money and effort, to make sacrifices and run risks,
and to do so indefinitely. They and their successors were to succeed for the fol-
lowing reasons:
• They faced reality and accepted the responsibility and the price—in money,
effort, and risk—of preserving the peace that had cost so much to win.
• They had, and were understood to have, no aggressive or expansionist
intentions of their own. This won them the trust and cooperation of the
other states that wanted to preserve the peace and were fearful of the
intentions of the dissatisfied nations.
• Fully aware of the importance of a wide range of means, they nonetheless
faced the fact that political, economic, and military power remain the most
important weapons for resisting aggression and preserving peace.
• They had, and despite some lapses maintained, the military strength and
economic resources to deter attempts to change the balance of power by
force or the threat of force.
• In spite, again, of some important lapses, they retained the will to use their
resources and the military strength needed to resist aggression and
intimidation.
• They were prepared to accept and adjust to changes that came peacefully
and did not threaten the safety of the international order.
The United States in the Cold War carried out its responsibility to its own
interests and safety, as well as to those of most of the states in the international
system, and thereby helped preserve the peace. Oddly enough, the peace of
1945 that was no peace—in the senses that there was no general treaty and that
the victorious powers at once fell out and engaged in a dangerous rivalry that
many believed could end only in nuclear war—proved to be one of the more
successful peaces in history, and its success provides a valuable lesson. Peace
does not keep itself. The formalities and even the conditions of a peace are less
important than the determination of those who wish to preserve it. The remark-
able men who worked out a strategy to preserve the unpromising peace that
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ended the Second World War, and those who tenaciously held to it in spite of the
greatest tests and difficulties, deserve the gratitude of all in the world who seek
peace and freedom.
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